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the decedent's heart attack was caused by the physical strain exerted in his attempt to
overcome the boat's unseaworthiness. Plaintiff had also claimed that Maloney and A&H
negligently failed to obtain the requested insurance and negligently made
misrepresentations to the decedent that the insurance had been procured. Plaintiff further
argued that Maloney and A&H negligently induced the decedent to remain in Brazil
without insurance after mistakenly notifying the decedent that his valid application was
pending with a second company because it had originally been denied.
The Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment orders dismissing the
causes of action against Colvin, L&H, and Maloney and reinstated the actions against
each. The summary judgment motion dismissing the complaint against A&H was
affirmed on the law, without costs.
The Appellate Division concluded that there was sufficient evidence to create
questions of fact as to whether (1) R.J. Maloney Agency negligently failed to procure life
insurance and/or whether the decedent relied upon the false advice that the insurance was
in effect; (2) whether Colvin is liable for the failure to procure life insurance; and (3)
whether Colvin and L&H may be liable under maritime law, on the basis that the vessel
was unseaworthy, or based upon negligence under the Jones Act. As to the claim against
A&H the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant was the decedent's broker or had
agreed to provide insurance.
Monica Brescia

HEARING LOSS UNDER THE "LAST EMPLOYER" DOCTRINE
An employer who is liable under the doctrine cannot escape liability because a
second employer can also be held liable for a later, separate injury

Stevedoring Services of America v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs
297 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Decided June 16, 1999)
Stevedoring Services of America ("SSA") and Eagle Pacific Insurance Co.
("Eagle") petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a review
of a decision of the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board ("Board")
to award permanent partial disability benefits under the Longshore and H arbor Workers'
Compensation Act ("LH WCA") to James Benjamin ("Benjamin") for a 34 percent
hearing loss sustained during his employment.
Benjamin had worked as a longshoreman from 1969 to 1992. Like other workers
in the industry, Benjamin did not have a single long-term employer but was assigned
through a union hall. On February 4, 1991, while under the employment of Container
Stevedoring Company, ("Container") Benjamin underwent an audiogram that showed a
28. 5 percent binaural hearing loss. Based on this test, Benjamin filed a claim for benefits
under LHWCA; however that claim was never independently adjudicated. Benjamin
continued to work, despite the hearing loss, until April 3, 1992 and on his last day of
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work he was employed by SSA. Benjamin later underwent two more hearing tests in
1994 and 1996; the latter of which showed that his hearing loss had worsened to 34
percent.
The Administrative Law Judge, ("ALJ") in determining Benjamin's claims for
compensation under LH WCA, found that although the audiograms conducted in 1991
and 1996 both complied with all rules and regulations governing the measurement of
hearing loss under the Act, that he was bound by the Ninth's Circuit's decision in Port of
Portland v Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 932 F.2d. 836, 841 (9th
Cir. 1991) and Ramey v. Stevedoring Servs. OfAm., 134 F.3d 954, 861 (9th Cir. 1998) to
pick one test as the detem1inative audiogram. The ALJ also found that precedent dictated
that the last employer before the determinative audiogram be liable for the claimant's
entire injury. Thus, the ALJ found SSA solely liable for the full extent of Benjamin's
hearing loss. H owever, this liability was mitigated when the ALJ granted SSA's
application for Special Fund Relief under 33 U.S.C. § 908(f) which permits mitigation of
employer liability because of an employees pre-existing condition. The ALJ found that
SSA was only liable for the extent of Benjamin's hearing loss between 1991 and 1996
audiograms or 5.5 percent. The remaining 28.5 percent was to be paid by the industry's
special fund that spreads the cost over the entire industry.
The Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs ("Director") and SSA
appealed the ALJ decision to the Board. The Director claimed Benjamin suffered two
distinct hearing losses, giving rise to two claims to be adjudicated separately, and that
Container and SSA should have been found separately liable for the impairment caused
by each injury. SSA argued that the Board should permit assessment of liability on the
basis of more than one audiogram. The Board rejected their arguments and affirmed the
ALJ.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in reviewing the Board's decision,
noted that decisions made by the Board are to be reviewed de novo for errors of law and
adherence to the substantial evidence formula. The court made clear that the Board is
required to accept the ALI's findings unless they are contrary to law, irrational, or
unsupported by substantial evidence.
The court further noted that on issues of
interpretation of LHWCA, the view of the Director, not the Board, is to be given
considerable deference. However, the court must respect interpretations by the Board
where they are reasonable and reflect the policy underlying the statute.
The Court of Appeals explained that the "last employer rule' was a judicially
created doctrine where full liability for an occupational disease resulting from claimants
exposure to injurious stimuli during more than one period of employment or insurance
coverage is assigned to a single employer or insurer. The employer during the last
employment in which the claimant was exposed to injurious stimuli, prior to the date
upon which the claimant became aware of the occupational disease naturally arising out
of his employment, should be liable for the full amount of the award. Under this rule full
recovery is allowed in a single action, as opposed to piecemeal recovery against each
contributing employer.
In the present case, the ALJ found that there were two valid audiograms, both of
which established hearing loss due to employment. Although Benjamin filed separat<;:
claims, no action was taken on the first audiogram. Later the ALJ treated the two claims
as merged placing full liability under the "last employer rule" on SSA.
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The Court of Appeals found the ALJ interpretation of the "last employer doctrine"
was a misreading of Port of Portland and Ramey; and the AJL erred when he merged
these claims. The court noted that although the "last employer doctrine" involves a
certain amount of arbitrariness, it does not extend to hold an employer liable for a claim
that had first been filed against a separate employer, and was simply not resolved. Thus,
had the first claim been dealt with expeditiously, the second claim would have been
considered a separate injury. H ere, the two reliable audiograms pointed to two separate
injuries sustained while under the employ of Container and SSA. Under these
circumstances it was error to treat the claims stemming from two valid audiograms as one
undifferentiated injury.
The Court of Appeals concluded that in a hearing loss case where a claimant
may continue to work despite being considered legally disabled, he may be exposed to
additional injury over time. Thus, an employer who is liable under the application of the
"last employer doctrine" should not be able to escape liability just because a second
employer can also be held liable under the same doctrine for a later, separate injury.
Therefore the Court of Appeals held that under the correct application of the "last
employer doctrine" Container is liable for 28.5 percent of the hearing loss shown in the
1991 audiogram. The appellate court reversed the Board's decision and remanded it to
the Board for consideration in light of its opinion.
Brian F. Allen

PERSONAL INJURY UNDER THE JONES ACT, LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKER'S
COMPENSATION ACT AND NEW YORK LABOR LAW
A dockbuilder is not a seaman and therefore cannot sue under the Jones Act. A
subcontractor's employee can sue a general contractor for negligence under the
LHWCA. New York Labor Law§§ 200 and 240 (6) grant an injured worker
recourse against general contractors who breach their duty to provide a safe
workplace.

O'Hara v. Weeks Marine, Inc.
294 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Decided April 1, 2002)
Plaintiff, Gerard O'Hara ("O'Hara"), a dockbuilder's union member, suffered a
work-related injury while repairing a pier in Staten Island, New York. Two barges- a
"materials barge" and a "crane barge"- were employed for the project and moored to
bulkheads on the pier. Plaintiff was employed by Collazo Contractors, Inc. ("Collazo")
and assigned to the crane barge where the injury occurred.
Plaintiff brought suit in the United State District Court for the Eastern District of
New York against general contractor Weeks Marine, Inc. ("Weeks") and subcontractor
Collazo, claiming damages under the Jones Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act ("LHWCA").
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